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Summary Findings
This paper documents recent advances of research on labor market 
institutions, behavior, and policies in developing countries and makes 
suggestions for future research. The four areas of research analyzed 
are: i) theoretical and empirical implications of employment protection 
legislation  on  labor  outcomes;  ii)  the  issue  of  shifting  from  job  to 
worker  protection,  namely,  the  different  alternatives  to  severance 
pay:  unemployment  insurance  and  unemployment  insurance 
savings accounts and their application to developing countries; iii) 
the  effect  of  active  labor  market  programs,  particularly  of  training, 
on labor market outcomes, and iv) the causes and consequences of 
informality in the labor market, with special emphasis on the efforts 
to  model  the  informal  sector. The  focus  of  the  four  sections  is  on 
theoretical and empirical work on published in the last 5 to 7 years, 
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This paper documents recent advances of research on labor market institutions, behavior, 
and policies in developing countries and makes suggestions for future research. The four 
areas of research analyzed are: i) theoretical and empirical implications of employment 
protection legislation on labor outcomes; ii) the issue of shifting from job to worker 
protection, namely, the different alternatives to severance pay: unemployment insurance 
and unemployment insurance savings accounts and their application to developing 
countries; iii) the effect of active labor market programs, particularly of training, on labor 
market outcomes, and iv) the causes and consequences of informality in the labor market, 
with special emphasis on the efforts to model the informal sector. The focus of the four 
sections is on theoretical and empirical work on published in the last 5 to 7 years, and 
each one concludes with new directions for future research. 
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I. Introduction 
 
This paper documents recent advances of research on labor market institutions, behavior, 
and policies in developing countries and makes suggestions for future research. Labor 
market institutions include a wide range of topics going from wage-setting mechanisms 
(collective bargaining, minimum wages), labor tax policies, product market regulation, 
EPL (employment protection legislation), to active and passive labor market programs 
(training, public works, unemployment insurance). Despite the relevance of all these for 
labor market outcomes, the focus of this review of the literature is narrowed down to the 
following four topics:  
 
i)  Effects of employment protection legislation on labor market outcomes,  
 
ii)  Shifting from job to worker protection,  
 
iii)  Effects of active labor market policies on labor market outcomes, and 
 
iv)  Causes and consequences of formality and informality in the labor market.  
 
In this paper, I look at theoretical and empirical work published in the last 5 to 7 years. 
The pieces of work reviewed include research papers published in peer reviewed journals 
or books, and working papers of similar style. The next section presents theoretical and 
empirical implications of employment protection legislation on labor outcomes, as well 
as some stylized facts. Section III addresses the issue of shifting from job to worker 
protection and describes some of the different alternatives to severance pay, namely, 
unemployment insurance and unemployment insurance savings accounts and their 
application to developing countries. Section IV concentrates on the effect of active labor 
market programs, particularly of training, on labor market outcomes. The last substantial 
section analyzes the causes and consequences of informality in the labor market, with 
special emphasis on the efforts to model it for developing countries. Each of the four 
sections ends with new directions for future research; finally, Section VI concludes.  
 
 
II. Effects of Employment Protection Regulations 
 
This section of the literature review concentrates on the latest theoretical and empirical 
work on the effects of EPL on different economic outcomes, such as employment, 
unemployment, turnover, productivity, and poverty. 
These institutions seem to have little impact on the labor markets of some regions, where 
most of the employment is in the informal economy (see section V of this review for an 
overview of informality). On the other hand, labor market institutions are perceived as a 
binding constraint in other regions. This section of the literature review looks at the 
regions of the world where research on EPL has been conducted, namely, Europe and 
Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and South Asia.   3 
Theoretical Implications 
 
Employment protection legislation refers to hiring and firing arrangements. The idea 
behind most employment protection rules is to enhance job security by making dismissals 
costly to the employer. Moreover, by reinforcing job security, EPL may enhance 
productivity performance, as workers will be more willing to co-operate with employers 
in the development of the production process. However, by making dismissal more 
costly, EPL can also have the unintended effect of creating hiring disincentives for 
employers, and tend to reduce labor reallocation from less to more productive activities 
and reduce firms’ performance and their potential for job creation. Additionally, rules 
restricting “non-standard” employment (fixed-term contracts, temporary agency workers, 
etc) reinforce job security rules that constrain employer dismissal rights.  
 
There are various ways in which these rules can affect labor market outcomes including 
labor dynamics, employment levels, the composition of employment, and productivity 
growth. In this subsection, I review the theoretical implications; in the next, I concentrate 
on the empirical findings. 
 
Theoretically, the clearest effects are on labor market dynamics. EPL can be expected to 
lengthen job tenure and reduce labor turnover. All other things equal, stronger job 
security stabilizes employment levels, not only reducing layoffs in downturns but also 
reducing hiring in upturns. This will protect jobs for incumbent employees but limit 
hiring opportunities for the unemployed and underemployed. As a result, duration of 
unemployment (and employment) is expected to be positively correlated to the degree of 
employment protection. 
 
The impact of employment protection on the average level of employment (and 
unemployment) through the business cycle is more ambiguous. Whether employment 
rates within the firm increase or decrease with tighter EPL depends on how the decline in 
hiring compares with the decline in firing. This in turn depends on assumptions about the 
persistence of labor demand shocks, the elasticity of labor demand, how firms discount 
future hiring costs at the time of hiring, etc (Betcherman, 2004).  
 
Job security rules, however, should affect the composition of employment in various 
ways: they can shift labor demand to informal sectors, firms, or employment types. An 
example in the recent literature is Kugler (2004). The author proposes a theoretical model 
in which job security regulations provide incentives for high turnover firms to operate in 
the informal sector. This decision would entail producing at a small, less efficient scale in 
order to remain inconspicuous to tax and labor authorities.  
 
The theoretical literature on the impact of EPL on productivity growth seems to show that 
stringent hiring and firing restrictions are costly in terms of average productivity. Among 
the recent theoretical literature, Poschke (2007) develops a model of endogenous growth 
through selection and imitation. In this framework, firing costs not only induce 
misallocation of labor, but also affect growth by affecting firms’ exit decisions. The 
authors’ simulations show a reduction in growth, and the impact on growth rates is larger   4 
in sectors where firms face larger idiosyncratic shocks, as in services. Also, by raising the 
cost of labor adjustments, EPL slows down the process of adoption of new technologies 
(see World Bank (2004) for a review). 
 
In the end, there are arguments that EPL raises efficiency, reduce efficiency, and have no 
effect on outcomes beyond distribution. To determine which arguments are valid for 
which institutions under which economic conditions requires evidence on the actual link 




Determining how institutions affect outcomes across countries is challenging. The 
literature has encountered a series of empirical problems that make it difficult to draw 
causal relationships between EPL and labor market outcomes and to extract general 
conclusions: problems in creating standardized measures of de jure EPL, and the, 
sometimes limited, connection of de jure to de facto enforcement, and, among others, 
difficulties endemic to cross-country analysis.  
 
In this subsection, I review research papers dealing with problems of measurement of 
EPL, problems of attribution of outcomes to EPL, as well as different solutions proposed 
in the recent literature. Finally, I present some stylized facts regarding the effects of EPL 
on labor market outcomes. 
 
Measuring EPL 
There have been various approaches to measuring the degree of job security protection. 
Most studies have created ordinal indices based on statutory rules. This approach is the 
most commonly used in OECD countries (see Freeman (2007) for a review). 
  
Another approach, and the most ambitious one, is to create a cardinal index by 
calculating the costs to employers of complying with EPL. The most complete effort to 
do this has been done for Latin America and the Caribbean by Heckman and Pages 
(2000). The authors create a job security index which attempts to measure the expected 
future cost, at the time of hiring, of dismissing a worker for economic reasons (cost of 
complying with severance pay and advance notice requirements). Naturally, 
consideration of the monetary costs requires taking into account factors that capture the 
probability that severance pay will be paid and to whom. Therefore, data on voluntary 
turnover and the distribution of the labor force by the same characteristics as define the 
entitlements for severance pay (i.e. occupational and tenure distributions) is essential. 
According to Addison and Teixeira (2001), absent some heroic assumptions, the virtue of 
simplicity of this cardinal measure is lost.  
 
A third approach is based on the judgment of executives in different countries regarding 
how hard it is to adjust employment levels to economic realities (Pierre and Scarpetta, 
2004). This strategy allows a longer time series to be assembled and can measure the 
varied dimensions of dismissals protection. However, some obvious problems with this 
approach are subjectivity, the consistency of responses when economic conditions facing   5 
firms differ, changes in the identity of the manager respondent, and even changes in the 
relevant question. 
 
Measuring the impact of EPL 
Labor regulations change very infrequently and tend to be applied at the national level to 
all workers. Therefore, determining the empirical effects of labor institutions is a 
challenging endeavor.  
 
Most studies resort to cross-country differences in institutions and outcomes. However, 
those estimates are not sufficiently reliable. Given the small number of countries and 
limited time variation in these studies, they cannot control for unobserved country 
differences. Many studies also fail to control for endogeneity of regulations. Furthermore, 
cross-country estimates do not account for differences in measurement across countries, 
introducing measurement error in the dependent variable.  
 
To surmount some of the problems faced by existing cross-country estimates, Micco and 
Pages (2006) propose a new method to estimate the economic effects of employment 
regulations. Their test exploits time and geographical variation, as well as sector 
differences across countries, to implement a difference-in-differences methodology.  
Contrary to most existing literature on employment regulation, which is based solely on 
industrial countries, this study relies on a sample of developed and developing countries. 
The authors argue that by expanding the sample to developing countries and by using 
difference-in-differences estimation, the likelihood of omitted variable bias is reduced. 
This study also controls for differences in the level of enforcement, proxied by rule of 
law measures. The authors develop a simple theoretical model, in which sector 
differences in the intrinsic volatility of demand and supply shocks lead to differential 
effects of employment protection across sectors. They find that EPL reduces job flows, 
particularly in more volatile sectors. These effects occur both in developed and 
developing countries, but are stronger in countries with better law enforcement. The 
authors also state that employment and value added of high-reallocation sectors decline in 
relative terms, and these employment effects are entirely driven by a reduction in the 
entry of new plants in those sectors, as employment per plant is not significantly affected. 
Finally, the study concludes that, by reducing the size of the most affected industries, 
labor regulations are likely to reduce firm entry, employment, and value added at the 
aggregate level. 
 
Haltiwanger et al (2006) also use a difference-in-difference approach to minimize 
possible endogeneity and omitted variable problems associated with cross-country 
regressions. The authors review the process of job creation and destruction across a 
sample of 16 industrial and emerging economies over the past decade. They exploit a 
harmonized firm-level data-set from business registers and enterprise census data. Their 
empirical results suggest that stringent hiring and firing costs reduce job turnover, 
especially in those industries that require more frequent labor adjustment. Regulations 
also seem to distort the patterns of industry/size flows. 
   6 
A second type of study focuses on changes in institutions. This type of analysis holds 
fixed country and year, and therefore isolates the effect of policies on outcomes by 
comparing countries that underwent policy changes (treatment group) with those which 
did not (control group). The downside of this type of analysis is that developments in 
other countries are not necessarily good counterfactuals for the countries which did 
change policies (Freeman, 2007). To overcome this, Abadie et al (2007) propose a 
method to produce a better counterfactual consisting of a composite of countries that give 
the best predictor of outcomes for the country prior to its change in policy.
1
 
 Even if a 
given institutional change produced a particular change in one country, it is not clear that 
the same effect will be produced elsewhere.  
A third type of study compares outcomes between workers within countries, where 
different institutions coexist. This approach is better than the second one in that it holds 
fixed the factors that affect a country. A few examples of this type of analysis in 
developing countries in the recent past are described below (Petrin and Sivadasan, 2006 
for Chile; Besley and Burguess, 2004 and Ahsan and Pages, 2007 for India).  
 
Petrin and Sivadasan (2006) use census data of Chilean manufacturing firms for the years 
1979-1996 to study the effect of EPL, taking advantage of two significant increases in the 
cost of dismissing employees in the period. The authors develop a new statistic to 
estimate the within-firm gap between the marginal revenue product of labor and the wage 
directly, using plant-level production data. They show little evidence of a negative impact 
on labor demand, but find that EPL introduces economically and statistically significant 
costs to the economy. Their empirical test confirms their theoretical predictions that 
firing costs drive a wedge between the marginal revenue product and its marginal cost. 
The authors find large and statistically significant increases in both the mean and the 
variance of the within-firm gap between the marginal product of labor of labor and the 
wage for both white and blue collar workers; however, they find little positive effect on 
the mean and variance gap for non-labor inputs. 
 
Besley and Burgess (2004) present a theoretical model and an empirical test of the effect 
of labor regulations on economic outcomes, such as employment, productivity, and 
poverty. The authors take advantage of the fact that in India most regulatory authority lies 
vested in the central authorities with the exception of labor regulation and analyze the 
effect of changing labor regulations in explaining the performance of Indian 
manufacturing in the period 1958-1992.
2 
3
As a first step of their empirical methodology, Besley and Burgess look at each of the 
state level amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 and code them as being 
either neutral, pro- or anti-worker. This time and cross-sectional variation within India is 
used to identify the effects of changes in labor regulations. The authors show that pro-
 This paper also lays out a theoretical model 
that links bargaining power with economic performance in the manufacturing sector, 
assuming this sector is embedded in a larger economy only through wages and prices. 
                                                 
1 Software to compute the estimators proposed in this article is available at the authors’ web-pages. 
2 Labor legislation falls concurrently under the authority of both Central and State governments. 
3 Similarly, Autor et al (2006) exploits variation in the extent and timing of adoption of employment 
protection across U.S. states.    7 
worker amendments are associated with lowered investment, employment, productivity, 
and output in registered manufacturing. Furthermore, they find a positive association with 
increases in urban poverty. 
 
Ahsan and Pages (2007) follow the methodology laid out in Besley and Burgess (2004) 
with the following modifications. The main innovation of this paper is on distinguishing 
the effects on economic outcomes of the amendments of the laws concerning job security 
and those related to the resolution of labor disputes. The authors also pay special 
attention to the most contentious regulation of all: Chapter 5b of the Industrial Disputes 
Act, which stipulates that firms above a certain size threshold cannot retrench workers 
without permission from the State. Secondly, they provide a first attempt to study the 
combined effects of legal amendments on different types of de jure labor regulations and 
of the increasing use of contract labor (de facto) in India. Finally, the authors assess 
whether there are differential effects across individual industries and across labor and 
capital intensive sectors. Ahsan and Pages find that both types of regulations (EPL and 
dispute resolution) hurt registered sector workers and bring substantial costs on society.  
Labor-intensive industries, such as textiles, are the hardest hit by job security regulations, 
while capital-intensive industries are most affected by changes in dispute resolution 
procedures. The widespread and increasing use of contract labor brought some 
employment and output gains, but it did not make up for the adverse effects of labor laws, 
particularly on employment. 
 
Bhattacharjea  (2007) offers a critique of these two and other empirical studies on the 
impact of labor regulation on industrial performance in India. The author also reviews 
earlier studies that tried to infer the effects on manufacturing employment of amendments 
to the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) in 1976 and 1982 that required government 
permission for layoffs, retrenchments and closures, and shows that the results are 
ambiguous. The study then criticizes the widely-used index of state-level labor regulation 
devised by Besley and Burgess (2004) and used by Ahsan and Pages (2007), and the 
econometric methodology they use to establish that excessively pro-worker regulation led 
to poor performance in Indian manufacturing. Several points are mentioned: a) scoring of 
several individual measures is erroneous, b) combination of scores is not comparable 
across states, c) other laws are ignored, etc. The author, however, does not attempt to 
address these issues empirically and it is not clear if results would change significantly 
once his points are taken into account. 
 
Another criticism to this third approach is that these comparisons measure differences 
between institutionally determined and market determined outcomes but not necessarily 
identify the structural impact of the institutions. According to Freeman (2007), this 
approach misses potential spillover of institutionally determined outcomes on other 
workers, who can be helped or harmed depending on the nature of the interactions 
between sectors.  
 
Stylized Facts 
Despite measurement problems, however, much has been learned and some stylized facts 
are found in the empirical literature in developing countries:   8 
 
  Consistent with the theoretical literature, employment promotion legislation has 
been shown to reduce turnover (Betcherman et al, 2001; Maloney, 2001; IADB,  
2004; World Bank, 2006; Haltiwanger et al (2006) ; Ahsan and Pages, 2007). An 
exception to this evidence is Gonzaga (2003); the author finds that EPL in Brazil 
actually encourages turnover at the expense of investments in specific human 
capital.   
 
  Also consistent with the theory, findings are not conclusive regarding the effects 
of institutions on other aggregate economic outcomes, such as employment and 
unemployment (Micevska, 2004; Freeman, 2007; also see Heckman and Pages, 
2004 for more examples). However, this could happen because of measurement 
problems (ordinal ranking indicators). As discussed above, Micco and Pages 
(2006), using difference-in-difference estimation approach in their cross-country 
analysis find a negative relationship between EPL and employment.  Furthermore, 
some argue that the ambiguous conclusions result from studies based on the 
analysis of cross-country time series with little variation in regulatory policies.  
Evidence from studies using large micro-data sets find negative relationships 
between EPL and employment (Haltiwanger et al. (2003) for CEE, Russia, and 
Ukraine, Heckman and Pages (2004) for LAC, Autor el al (2006) for the US, plus 
the examples analyzed in this review: Besley and Burgess (2004) and Ahsan and 




  There is a positive association between employment protection and self-
employment (Addison and Teixeira, 2001; Betcherman et al, 2001; World Bank, 
2006 and Djankov et al, 2008 for ECA countries)  Further progress in 
understanding this association requires that more work is done on the opportunity 
costs of self-employment, including the relative level of security contributions 
that have to be paid by the self-employed. 
 
  Employment protection changes the composition of employment. When hiring 
and firing becomes difficult, firms tend to hire and retain only those workers who 
are viewed as highly productive, relative to their cost. (Betcherman et al, 2001; 
Micevska, 2004; Freeman, 2007)
5
                                                 
4 Freeman (2007) tells the story of the evolution of the debate in OECD countries. First, he cites a statement 
from 2005: “The broad movements in unemployment in the OECD can be explained by shifts in labor 
market institutions”. Then, Freeman reviews recent critical analysis of the evidence in developed countries 
that has rejected these strong statements. However, the debate continues as Bassanini and Duval (2006) 
found changes in tax and labor policies explain about half of the 1982-2003 changes in unemployment 
among OECD countries. These authors take into account many of the criticisms of earlier cross-country 
time series data (comparability across countries, new econometric techniques) 
 Heckman and Pages (2004) find that job 
security in the LAC region reduces the employment prospects of young, female 
5  Also, regarding employment outcomes, the empirical literature has not explored in depth whether there 
are differential effects in the intensive and extensive margins: that is, have employment levels changed 
because of a change in average employment or output per firm or because of a change in net entry of firms. 
Exceptions to this are Micco and Pages (2006), Besley and Burgess (2004), and Kluger and Pica (2005).   9 
and unskilled workers, and segregates the labor market between workers with 
secure jobs and workers with very few prospects of becoming employed formally. 
 
  Theoretically, restrictions should reduce productivity growth; however, empirical 
evidence is scarce. The literature on the impact on productivity growth is thin at 
the international level and thinner still in developing countries (see Besley and 
Burgess (2004) for India; Pages and Micco (2006) for 11 developed and 7 Latin 
American countries; Hoek (2007) for Brazil; Autor et al. (2007) for the US).
6
 
   
  Most studies in developing countries concentrate on efficiency outcomes and not 
on equity. An exception to this is Besley and Burgess (2004), described above. 
The authors analyze the effects of EPL on poverty in India and find a positive 




Directions for Future Work 
 
There is still work to do. As Blanchard (2005, pp.1) puts it “There is fairly wide 
agreement among economists on what constitutes optimal or, at least, good product 
market and financial market institutions. There is much less agreement on what 
constitutes optimal or, at least, good labor market institutions”. 
 
Besides from improving the actual measurement of EPL and the methods by which its 
effects on labor market outcomes are captured, it is advisable to direct future work on the 
following areas: 
 
Improving data available 
1.  Analyzing micro data sets that focus on measuring labor practices (such as the 
UK’s Workplace Employment Relations Survey, WERS)  
 
2.  Adding measures of labor policies and practices to matched employee-employer 
to allow comparisons of behavior of the same worker under different labor 
practices, the effect of practices on selectivity of workers, and the effects of 
practices on productivity. 
 
Analyzing the political economy of labor market reforms 
1.  In the area of labor market reform, the available knowledge of political economy 
seems to be practically non-existent. Even if we build up the knowledge base 
about the most useful substantive directions in labor market reforms, this will 
                                                 
6 Abidoye et al (2007) show that the presence of firing costs significantly distorts hiring decisions by firms. 
The authors use a difference in difference specification on data collected between 1995 and 2003 by the 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka on employment growth by firm. They show that the Termination of Employment 
of Workmen Act, which requires firms with more than 14 employees to pay severance costs to displace 
workers, induces clustering at 14 employees unless firms are atypically productive. 
7 Almeida and Carneiro (2007) analyze the efficiency-equity trade-off of labor market regulations for the 
case of Brazilian cities; however, their measure of labor market regulations is not EPL.  
   10 
need to be complemented by a better understanding of the political aspects of a 
successful reform.  
2.  Adapting labor legislation to the feminization of the labor force 
 
Taking advantage of other areas of research 
Freeman (2007) suggests that to help increase the knowledge of institutions, other areas 
of research should be explored: 
1.  Experimental economics: experiments that reflected real world institutions, such 
as group decisions, would provide researchers with realistic priors about what to 
expect from those institutions outside the laboratory. 
2.  Game theory and implementation Theory: theories of behavior under different 
bargaining rules could direct attention at institutional reforms that would increase 
the potential for Coase-theorem bargains. 
3.  Artificial agent simulations: analysts would “grow” artificial economies and then 
simulate the effects of institutional changes on economic outcomes. 
 
Analyzing the economic significance of EPL 
One of the issues raised in the literature is the suggestion that, whatever the sign, the 
economic significance of employment protection is modest. According to Addison and 
Teixeira (2001), this assertion has two strands: i) are effects of EPL small?, and ii) are 
these effects important when considered alongside other features of a country’s labor 
market?. Their answer to the first question is that employment effects of EPL can be 
substantial. On the second question, however, the balance of the empirical literature 
suggests that there are offsets to potentially costly employment protection rules (for 
instance, the favorable association between collective bargaining and economic 
outcomes). Following Addison and Texeira, future studies should analyze the 
consequences of the interaction of EPL with labor market institutions on labor market 
outcomes. 
III. Shifting From Job to Worker Protection 
 
This section of the paper reviews recent research on how to shift from job to worker 
protection, by promoting change from the current protection mechanisms based on 
employment protection legislation towards income support mechanisms. This new 
approach can provide adequate protection against the risk of unemployment while 
creating fewer distortions in the economic activity. Even though there have been 
speeches and public debates, there is no clear framework for analyzing this topic. 
However, some research has been trying to deal with specific issues such as severance 
payments, unemployment insurance, and individual savings accounts. 
 
This section addresses the following questions: Are there ways to improve income 
support schemes for the unemployed so as to shift protection from jobs to workers 
affected by layoffs? Are the examples of individual savings account adopted by some 
LAC countries viable options for other countries?  
 
Passive Labor Market Programs   11 
There is a range of passive instruments sponsored by governments to help workers deal 
with the risk of involuntary job loss, the short-term loss associated with not receiving 
labor income during unemployment, and the possible long-run losses associated with 
accepting jobs that pay less than previous ones. Most prominent are severance pay, and 
various systems for providing payments contingent on the state of being unemployed 
(which includes being available and searching for work). These include unemployment 
insurance (IU), individual savings accounts (ISA), and unemployment assistance (UA). 
The main differences among these instruments are related to eligibility, funding, and risk-
pooling. 
 
It is important to carefully evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of all options for 
providing income support to unemployed workers. Vodopivec (2002) identifies two main 
classes of performance criteria: distributive effects and efficiency effects. Distributive 
effects include coverage, adequacy of support, and income distribution. In terms of 
efficiency effects, the following are included: job-search efforts, post-unemployment 
wages, equilibrium labor market outcomes (employment, unemployment, labor force 
participation), restructuring and overall economic adjustment, labor supply of other 





Most developing countries have weak social security systems. De facto they tend to 
provide protection to formal jobs rather than workers. The main form of income support 
for formal workers is severance pay that suffers from lack of pooling of the 
unemployment risk and lack of reliability since it depends on the financial conditions of 
the firm. The existence of unemployment insurance, on the other hand, depends on the 
level of development and region. Virtually all developed countries, most transition 
countries in Eastern Europe and some Latin American countries have UI plans. 
Elsewhere, UI systems are not common. Unemployment assistance is prevalent in many 
European countries as a second-tier for UI exhaustees; however, it is a primary income 
replacement program only in a few countries, such as Australia. Given that UA does not 




Finally, individual savings accounts exist in some Latin American countries (Brazil, 
Colombia) where they have tended to evolve as funded severance pay systems (De 
Ferranti et al, 2000). 
Severance Pay  
 
Severance pay refers to lump-sum payments made to discharged workers either 
voluntarily by employers (through collective agreements or as part of firm policy) or as 
mandated by governments. In developing countries, generally, severance pay is provided 
                                                 
8 De Ferranti et al (2000) presents a similar, though less detailed, framework to assess options in Latin 
America (coverage, cost, incentives, insurance aspects). 
9 Providing an income-support program which does not exclude those who have not paid program 
contributions would be fiscally unsustainable for countries with large proportions of underemployment or 
unemployment. Applicability of UA programs seems to be limited to countries with relatively developed 
administrative capacity and a small informal sector (Vodopivec, 2006).   12 
only in some sectors or only in firms above certain sizes. Minimum years of service 
requirements are also sometimes used to limit eligibility (Vodopivec, 2004).  
 
Mandatory severance pay is an attractive system in developing countries because it 
requires little administrative capacity to monitor the unemployment status, does not 
require the collection of social contributions, and, given that it is paid as a lump sum, 
does not affect the efficiency of job search (Vodopivec, 2004).  
 
However, severance payments have many drawbacks than they have benefits. First of all, 
these payments offer only limited pooling of unemployment risk (within firms, not across 
them). Secondly, they do not protect workers against the duration of the risk. Those 
workers who remain unemployed for a long time might not receive enough funds to 
endure the unemployment spell. Last but not least, the proportion of all workers covered 
by severance payments tends to be low, as one of the pre-requisite seems to be for these 
workers to have formal indefinite contracts in the private sector (Pages et al, 2007).  
Furthermore, even among eligible workers, actual coverage is low (Sehnbruch, 2006).  
 
The above discussion about severance pay, as well as the discussion on EPL presented in 
the first section of this paper, suggest the need to move away from these job protection 
mechanisms, particularly, in countries in which most of the protection takes the form of 




One of the alternatives to severance pay systems is unemployment insurance (UI), and 
much of the literature on income protection is centered around moving into this type of 
income protection mechanism. Thanks to its wide risk-pooling, UI enables a high degree 
of consumption smoothing, thus offering a high degree of protection for formal sector 
workers. By providing additional resources, UI can contribute to shorten unemployment 
spells by enabling a more effective job search; however, direct evidence on the intensity 
of job search by benefit claimants is scarce and inconclusive (Vodopivec, 2004) . The 
costs of the system are covered either through general taxation, through social security 
payments, or both. The latter way of financing is the most common as the government 
generally provides the surplus financing when the system does not finance itself (Pages et 




However, UI typically brings various negative effects on efficiency that most likely 
outweigh its positive efficiency effects. In general, key conditions for UI to function 
properly are not present in developing countries: large variations in the probability of 
risk; extremely asymmetric information, with limited and costly opportunities for the 
insurer to obtain relevant information about individuals, which creates strong moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems; and high covariant risk (Vodopivec, 2006). 
Furthermore, by affecting job-search intensity and wage bargaining, benefits are found to 
prolong unemployment spells and increase equilibrium unemployment. (Van Ours and 
                                                 
10 Pages et al (2007), however, suggest that in Argentina, the government controls spending through 




 In addition, by interacting with shocks, benefits contribute to 
persistence of unemployment. Some other effects –on employment, labor force 
participation, and output and growth- are less clear and likely insignificant.  Moreover, 
actual coverage of UI is low and, as in all systems which benefit mostly registered 
workers, beneficiaries are disproportionately from the richer segment of the population 
(Vodopivec, 2004b).  
In the following paragraphs, I analyze four papers on unemployment insurance in more 
detail  (Van Ours and Vodopivec, 2006; Boeri and Macis, 2007; Boeri et al, 2003; and 
Vodopivec, 2004a). 
 
Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) investigate the disincentive effects of shortening the 
potential duration of UI benefits, by exploiting changes in Slovenia’s UI system. This 
“natural experiment” involved substantial reductions in the potential duration of benefits 
for four groups of workers and no change in benefits for the control group. The authors 
find that the change in potential duration of UI benefits had a positive effect on the exit 
rate from unemployment for unemployment spells of various lengths and for several 
categories of unemployed workers. In a follow up paper, Van Ours and Vodopicec (2007) 
use difference in difference estimation to show that the reduction on potential duration of 
UI was not accompanied by lower quality of post-unemployment jobs in terms of 
stability, type of appointment, and precariousness.   
 
Boeri and Macis (2007) make use of yearly panel data from a large number of countries 
for the period 1980-2001 to test whether unemployment insurance has allowed for more 
and “better” structural change to take place (measured as job creation, job destruction, 
job turnover, and sector reallocation). The authors focus on policy “experiments”, given 
the introduction from scratch of UI in many countries. Given the longitudinal nature of 
the data, the authors can control for selection, endogeneity and omitted variables issues. 
The introduction of UI seems to be associated with higher rates of turnover and labor 
reallocation across sectors.  
 
Boeri et al (2003) document the presence of a trade-off between unemployment benefits 
(UB) and employment protection legislation (EPL) in the provision of insurance against 
labor market risk. The mix of quantity restrictions and price regulations adopted by the 
various countries would seem to correspond to a stable politico-economic equilibrium. 
The authors develop a theoretical model in which voters are required to cast a ballot over 
the strictness of EPL and over the generosity of UB. Agents are heterogeneous along two 
dimensions: employment status - there are insiders and outsiders - and skills - low and 
high skills. Boeri et al show that if there exists a majority of low-skill insiders, the voting 
                                                 
11 However, Commander and Heitmueller (2007), using both aggregate and individual level data for a 
number of transition countries, find little evidence that institutions, particularly unemployment benefits, can 
explain differences in aggregate unemployment rates or flows. The change in aggregate unemployment 
rates and the increased share of the long-term unemployed with limited benefit entitlements suggests that 
the overall link between institutions and unemployment rates has been weaker than in Western Europe and 
other OECD countries. 
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game has a politico-economic equilibrium with low UB and high EPL; otherwise, the 
equilibrium features high UB and low EPL. Another testable implication of the model is 
that a larger share of elderly workers increases the demand for EPL. The authors show 
that in the case of Italy, panel data on institutions and on the age and educational 
structures of the populations are broadly in line with their results. 
 
Vodopivec (2004a) describes the case of Sri Lanka, where non-transparent and costly 
severance pay regulations discourage employment, hinder efficient reallocation of labor 
and push workers to the informal sector. Political considerations made the reform of the 
current system contingent on the introduction of an unemployment insurance system. 
Therefore, the author analyzes how to adapt UI to Sri Lanka’s circumstances, to 
minimize its adverse employment effects and administrative costs and to ensure 
affordability. Recommendations are to eliminate the conditions for continuing benefit 
eligibility, piggybacking on its existing channels and administrative capacity to 
administer benefit claims, and paying the UI benefit as a lump sum deposit to the 
beneficiary’s special savings account. Given that most of the unemployed belong to the 
non-poor population, financing by employers’ and workers’ contributions is also 
recommended. 
 
Ultimately, the performance of UI depends on the design of the program –and also on 
country-specific conditions. Its smooth and successful performance relies on strong 
administrative capacity to monitor program eligibility, an informal sector of modest size, 
a low incidence of underemployment, and low political risk. These conditions are 
typically lacking in developing and transition countries. Particularly in developing 
countries, its existence may also reduce incentives for self-protection and break down the 
habit of self-help within local communities (Attanasio and Rios-Rull, 2000)  
 
A way of improving the effectiveness and targeting of income support is to link it to 
active labor market programs (see section below on ALMPs). This has several 
advantages: only workers seeking a job are willing and able to participate in ALMPs and 
as such, the link with them becomes a targeting mechanism. However, in developing 
countries two constraints arise: administrative capacity and quality of service (see Pages 
et al. 2007 for LAC; Hahn and Vodopivec, 2007 for China). 
 
Introducing UI may be viewed as a possible longer-term goal for many developing 
countries (Vodopivec, 2006). In protecting workers from the risk of unemployment, 
countries can also consider other policies or programs. For instance, by avoiding or 
reducing the moral hazard problems inherent in UI, programs such as UI Savings 
Accounts might be promising options for developing countries where initial conditions 
seem to be suitable (see sub-section on UISAs below). East Asia and Latin America 
could be candidates, as the existence of pay programs may ease the transition.  
 
Unemployment Individual Savings Accounts 
 
To tackle the shortcomings of severance payments, some countries have introduced a 
form of pre-funding of payments, UISAs, to bring them more in line with international   15 
experience. One of the most important advantages of this system is that it reduces the 
moral hazard inherent in traditional unemployment insurance, by internalizing the costs 
of unemployment insurance. 
 
Individual unemployment savings accounts (UISA) require employers (and sometimes 
employees; i.e. Chile) to deposit a monthly contribution into individual workers’ 
accounts. Upon separation –and in most countries, regardless of the reason for separation- 
workers can make withdrawals from their savings accounts as they wish. Given that 
funds are owned by the workers, UISA does not require identifying the unemployment 
status and does not affect search intensity, avoiding moral hazard issues. Therefore, 
administration costs and requirements are reduced considerably. Furthermore, UISA has 
the potential to attract informal sector workers. 
 
However, there are a few disadvantages to the implementation of this system. The 
volatility of returns and the knowledge that the government will compensate for negative 
balances sometimes motivates workers to withdraw their funds in advance, through 
collision with firms. Furthermore, in many instances, funds are withdrawn for reasons 
other than unemployment. These features effectively make these funds part of the 
workers’ wage and undermine the primary role of the scheme. This is why in LAC, 
Colombia, Panama, Peru and Venezuela have adopted UISA, in addition to mandatory 
severance payments.  
 
Given that individual savings accounts are self-insurance mechanisms, they do not pool 
risks across workers; rather they smooth an individual’s income over his/her lifetime 
(Blanchard 2005). Chile and Ecuador have combined those with their unemployment 
insurance system (Pages et al., 2007). This dual system combines the benefits of both 
types of schemes; unemployment insurance can take over in the case where workers who 
face repeated unemployment spells have run down their UISA funds and are left without 
income support. 
 
Acevedo et al (2006) describe the unemployment insurance scheme in Chile, which, the 
authors argue, could be suitable to the reality of many developing countries. Its design 
consists of savings accounts and a redistributive pillar. This combination reduces the 
overuse and abuse problems associated with traditional UI and thus improves the focus 
and efficiency of the overall system. An important innovation has to do with the 
administration of the individual accounts and Common Fund; the system auctions the 
market to a single fund administrator for 10 years to avoid impossibly high 
administration fees. However, the short time of implementation and the lack of pre-
established control and treatment groups reduce the scope for evaluation of the program. 
 
The UISA program has been largely untested; therefore, there is a need for further 
research in terms of its effects and design parameters (Vodopivec, 2004b). The only 
empirical study of UISA is Kugler (2005) on the effects of the 1990 conversion of 
Colombia’s severance pay program into funded severance pay with individual accounts. 
The author uses data from the National Household Surveys for 1988-1996 and looks at 
wages of formal and informal workers (those covered and not covered by severance   16 
payments) who were hired before and after 1990. Kugler finds that the conversion 
increased both hiring and firing, and that it shifted between 60 to 80 percent of the cost of 
protection onto workers, in the form of lower wages. 
 
In the absence of other suitable real-world practices, Vodopivec and Rejec (2002) 
simulate the working of a UISA program for a transition country (Estonia). The 
protection provided by unemployment benefits is the same as under their current 
program, but it is financed through UISAs, to which individuals are required to contribute 
four percent of their wages. The authors find that 8-27 percent of workers end their active 
lives with negative cumulative balance on their UISA account, and 35-54 percent of 
workers experience negative balances on their UISA account at least once during their 
working lives (the lower numbers refer to the low-unemployment and the higher to the 
high-unemployment scenarios). 
 
This accounting exercise is very insightful; however, it is also important to evaluate the 
welfare implications of these systems. Hopenhayn and Hatchondo (2002) use data from 
Estonia (as Vodopivec and Rejec, 2002) and analyze the welfare consequences of 
alternative designs of UISAs, taking into account that costs and benefits depend on the 
specified rules and the behavioral response of the workers involved. Their specification 
helps eliminate Pareto dominated specifications, and provides a better picture of the 
trade-offs between governments’ cost and workers’ welfare. They find that a properly 
designed system can be a good substitute for full-insurance and that for moderate degrees 
of risk aversion, a cost effective system can be obtained with relatively high levels of 
worker contributions to their accounts and moderate replacement rates. 
 
In conclusion, the overall effect of UISAs depends on a vast array of country 
characteristics and program parameters. The success of these programs is greatly affected 
by its implementation, existing labor regulation, the extent of the informal economy, and 
the scope for collusive behavior (Ferrer and Riddell, 2004). This calls for a more 




Further testing of existing systems, specially UISAs 
In developing countries where informal sectors are large, added questions are raised 
about all unemployment benefit systems (including UI and ISAs) in terms of covering the 
labor force and identifying and verifying benefit eligibility. The fact that the above 
programs do not cover informal workers also means that they in fact may not include 
poorer sections of the population. In a context of low social protection, individuals who 
cannot afford to remain unemployed and are most likely to suffer poverty in the case of 
unemployment, will likely end up working in the informal sector. These individuals are 
the ones who then face higher probabilities of becoming unemployed and are not 
protected by social protection systems (Pages et al, 2007).
12
                                                 
12 As described in the last section of this paper, a significant portion of informal workers may have freely 
chosen to belong to the informal sector in order to avoid high taxes, cumbersome regulations and lack of 
prospects. 
 The question whether there   17 
should be a minimum form of insurance also to those outside the formal sector and of 
what kind, remains open. 
 
“The Optimal Design” 
Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and 
studied in isolation. Much of the policy discussion of labor market institutions has been at 
the margin, with proposals to tighten unemployment benefits, reduce employment 
protection, and so on. There has been little discussion however of what the ultimate goal 
and architecture should be.  
 
An exception to this is Blanchard and Tirole (2007). The authors make “a first pass” at 
this and focus on characterizing this ultimate goal, the optimal architecture of labor 
market institutions. In their paper, they draw out the implications for current policy 
debates and reform proposals, from the financing of unemployment insurance, to the 
respective roles of severance payments and unemployment benefits. They start the 
analysis with a simple benchmark, with risk averse workers, risk neutral firms and 
random shocks to productivity. In this benchmark, they show that optimality requires 
both unemployment insurance and employment protection---in the form of layoff taxes; it 
also requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits. The authors then 
explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations: limits on insurance, limits 
on layoff taxes, ex-post wage bargaining, and heterogeneity of firms or workers, and 
show how the architecture must be modified in each case. The scope for insurance may 
be more limited than in the benchmark; so may the scope for employment protection. The 
general principle remains however, namely the need to look at unemployment insurance 
and employment protection together, rather than in isolation. 
 
IV. Effects of Active Labor Market Policies  
 
The income support policies described in the previous section tend to work better when 
complemented with effective active labor market policies (ALMPs from now on). 
ALMPs include programs that enhance labor supply (through training); increase labor 
demand (through public works or subsidies); and improve the functioning of the labor 
market (through employment services). This section of the paper analyzes the most recent 
literature on the effects of ALMPs in developing countries. Even though extensive in 
developed countries (OECD countries especially), empirical or theoretical research on the 
effects of ALMPs is still sparse in developing countries (Auer et al, 2005). 
 
This review will focus mainly on the effects of training. Generally, training and re-
training programs account for a significant share of expenditures in ALMPs, ranging 
between 40% to 60% in most countries (Betcherman et al, 2004). To the extent that some 
training programs are specifically targeted to the unemployed, and provide an income 
allowance to the trainees, they can be viewed as a form of income support. 
 
Training and retraining for the unemployed aim to provide job seekers with marketable 
skills that potentially increase their chances of getting a job as well as their earning 
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capacity. Generally, the main types of disadvantaged job seekers that training programs 
target are the following: a) the long-term unemployed, under-employed or those with 
repeated spells of unemployment (individuals who experience difficulties in securing 
gainful employment);  b) the workers made redundant in downsizing sectors (mass 
layoffs); and c) the disadvantaged youth entering the labor market (Betcherman et al, 
2004).  
 
The most important questions this literature has been trying to answer are: What are the 
impacts of program participation on the future labor market outcomes of participants?, 
and What is the cost-effectiveness of programs? Unfortunately, most evaluations focus on 
the first question only; very few adequately address the cost question. In most ALMP 
evaluations, the key impact indicators are post-program employment rates and earnings. 
However, some evaluations also look at other social indicators such as criminal rates, 
teenage pregnancy, and receipt of government benefits. 
 
The experience in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Special efforts to evaluate training programs have been done in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Ibarraran and Rosas, 2006; Betcherman et al, 2007 and Puerto, 2007 for youth 
programs in particular; Sanchez Puerta, 2009) 
 
Ibarraran and Rosas (2006) produced an extensive review of job training programs in 
LAC, financed by the Inter-American Development Bank. This review includes scientific 
impact assessments in Argentina, Chile, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama and Peru, 
and thorough institutional assessments in Paraguay and Colombia. Employment effects 
range from null to ten percentage points, on average slightly better than those reported in 
the literature for OECD countries. The impacts are not homogeneous and vary by age, 
gender and region; in general women and the youngest exhibit higher employment rates. 
Conditional on employment, the authors find positive impacts in terms of the quality of 
jobs trainees get. They provide evidence on the cost effectiveness of the programs, by 
attempting to measure whether the direct monetary costs are recovered. The authors 
conclude that direct costs are recovered in a relatively short period in Dominican 
Republic and Panama (where the best data on costs and benefits is available). 
Furthermore, programs in Peru, Chile, and Argentina show positive rates of return under 
a wide set of assumptions. 
 
Puerto (2007) presents a review of youth programs in LAC. These have focused on 
motivating youth and fostering on-the-job training of young school dropouts and other 
vulnerable youths. Mainly, programs that combine training with other services such as 
job search assistance (Jovenes program) have been developed since the 1990s in the LAC 
region, and they have been rigorously evaluated in countries such as Argentina, Chile, 
Peru, and Dominican Republic, among others. Net impact evaluations have shown that 
these programs improve employment and earnings prospects of participants. The quality 
of the training seems to make a significant difference in the outcomes of the participants. 
Youth attending high quality courses in Peru had greater subsequent earnings (32 percent 
higher) 18 months after the program than those attending low quality courses (Chong and   19 
Galdo, 2006). The favorable assessments of these programs in Latin America raise the 
possibility that the disappointing track record of youth training in industrialized countries 
may not apply in developing countries. However, one should keep in mind that most 
evaluations only analyze the short-term impact of the program (maximum of 18 months 
after program exit), and they do not include an assessment of cost-effectiveness, even 
though costs per participant tend to be quite high. 
 
Training tends to have a positive impact on productivity 
The available rigorous empirical evaluations of training programs find that training 
increases firm-level productivity in Mexico (Tan and Lopez Acevedo, 2003) and in the 
Caribbean (McArdle, 2006). 
 
Tan and Lopez Acevedo (2003) use panel firm- level data to study in- firm training in 
Mexican manufacturing in the 1990s, its determinants, and effects on productivity and 
wages. The authors find that over this decade, not only did the incidence of employer 
provided training become more widespread among manufacturing enterprises, but a 
higher proportion of the workforce received training within firms. Technological change, 
as proxied by R&D, was an important driver of these training trends. The authors analyze 
the productivity and wage effects of training in three ways: (1) estimating the wage and 
productivity effects of training treated as endogenous; (2) using training event histories to 
examine the impacts of changing training status over time; and (3) looking at how 
training (and technology) practices changed over the 1990s. These cross-sectional and 
panel analyses show that training had large and statistically significant wage and 
productivity outcomes, that joint training and R&D yielded larger returns than 
investments in just one or the other, and that both training and technology investments 
enabled firms to improve their relative position in the wage and productivity distribution 
between 1993 and 1999. 
 
Mc Ardle (2006) analyzes firm and worker training in the Caribbean and concludes that a 
significant amount of training is taking place in the region, both in the firms and through 
the public sector financed programs. Training in firms is conducted to improve 
productivity; however, this is not the central policy objective for public sector providers. 
According to the author, evidence suggests that government-training programs as 
compensatory devices for deficiencies in the education system do not work; therefore, 
emphasis should be on actual training on productivity of firms. Since training in firms is 
different from institutional training and relates more closely to productivity, policies 
about financing training can be modified to improve cost-sharing, as in the case of 
Barbados.   
 
The efficacy of training differs by provider and modality.  
The majority of firms in the LAC region receive training from private providers. 
Naturally, there exists a large variation within the region. In Chile and Uruguay, 
employers rely mostly on private external training sources, whereas firms in other 
countries, such as Belize, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Trinidad and Tobago involve public 
training suppliers to a larger extent (Cintefor, 2001, De Ferranti et al 2003). 
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Studies of programs in Mexico find that on the job training is more effective than 
classroom training (World Bank, 2004; Pages et al, 2007 for a review). Further, private 
training centers seem to outperform public training centers in the Caribbean, Colombia 
and Brazil (Marquez, 2002; Barrera and Higuera, 2004)  
 
Marquez (2002) discusses the institutional structure of training systems in Latin America 
and its adequacy to coordinate the acquisition and use of skills by the workforce. In order 
to examine the performance of these training systems, the author presents a number of 
impact evaluations in the region and concludes that they have had little impact on wages 
and on employability for most groups of the population, with the exception of adult 
women. Marquez concludes that private training providers have higher impact than 
public ones.  
 
Barrera and Higuera (2004) use data from the Social Household Survey and the Firms’ 
Perception Survey in Colombia to assess both the characteristics of the trainees and of the 
firms demanding and/or providing training. The authors find that larger firms tend to 
have the financial resources to provide training. Moreover, the capital intensity of a firm 
is positively associated with the demand for training, possibly indicating a 
complementarity between human and physical capital. On the household analysis, they 
find that training serves both as a substitute for formal education and to improve job 
conditions. The majority of the firms train their personnel at the workplace, rather than at 
the SENA (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje) or other private institutes; and this trend  
increased significantly between 1997 and 2002. 
 
The enforcement of quality and monitoring of relevant training, however, remains with 
the public sector. Such control from the authorities helps workers and employers choose 
among providers through transparent information on the value of the programs and 
provides a benchmark that new providers are expected to reach (Pages et al. 2007) 
 
Randomized Evaluations - LAC 
Randomized evaluations are not easy to carry out; they are expensive and often bring up 
political economy issues. This is why all the studies cited in this section have been based 
on quasi-experimental methods. In LAC, only Card et al (2007), and Attanasio et al 
(2007) have performed randomized evaluations of training. Their work is described 
below. 
 
Card et al (2007) present the results from the first impact evaluation based on an 
experimental design for a job training program in Latin America. Between 2001 and 2005 
the government of the Dominican Republic implemented a job training program for low 
income youth population in urban areas. The courses consisted of classroom training 
followed by an internship in a private sector firm. The eligible population was randomly 
selected, and information was gathered 10-14 months after graduation for both 
trainees and members of the control group. While most of the previous evaluations of 
similar programs, based on a quasi-experimental design, report positive impacts of  
training on the probability of having a job and on labor earnings, this evaluation does not   21 
find a significant impact on the likelihood of having a job. However, the authors find an 
impact on wages, of 10% on average, and also for the coverage of health insurance, 
conditional on employment. However, both results are only marginally significant. The 
results suggest that there is significant heterogeneity of impacts, with male teens being 
the group that benefits from the program; impacts were not found for women or for 
young adults. The authors suggest that the costs of the program are recovered in two 
years if the impact on wages is maintained over time.  
 
Attanasio, Kugler and Meghir (2007) represent the second of two randomized trials 
conducted in developing countries. The authors evaluate the impact and cost-
effectiveness of a randomized training program introduced in Colombia in 2005 on the 
labor market outcomes of trainees. Contrary to Card et al (2007)’s findings in Dominican 
Republic, Attanasio, Kugler and Meghir  find that raining had large, widespread effects 
on women, but fewer and less pronounced effects on men. The authors find that women 
have higher probability of being employed, of having a formal job and of having a job 
with a written contract. Women also tend to earn higher wages and profits. Their cost-
benefit analysis suggests that the program generates a net gain for women and a net loss 
for men. 
 
The Experience in Other Regions 
 
Betcherman et al (2004) review the overall experience in developing and transition 
countries. In particular, the authors pay attention to the quality of available impact 
evaluations and include only the “rigorous” ones (those performed using a control 
group).
13 They examine 49 evaluations of training programs primarily aimed at the 
unemployed. Most of these programs have the objective of skills development through 
classroom and/or on-the-job training, which can include gaining work experience. Some 
courses are not vocational in nature but are aimed at building self-confidence, basic job 
readiness, and enhancing knowledge of the job market. Of the 49 evaluations (19 from 
the study by Dar and Tzannatos in 1999 plus 30 new ones), only 14 are not from 
industrialized countries (10 from transition countries and four from developing 
countries). These programs often do have a positive impact on the future employment of 
participants – this was the case in 11 of the 14 studies where an effect could be 
determined. The impact on future earnings was much less favorable with only 3 of 9 




Betcherman et al (2007) present a global inventory of interventions to support young 
workers. The authors find that the most popular type of intervention in all regions is skills 
training for young people. One of the main objectives of the assessment is to find out 
“what works”; therefore, special attention is given to the quality of the available evidence 
on impact and cost-effectiveness of the evaluations. Regions such as Middle East and 
                                                 
13 The dominant methodological design for the training evaluations is quasi-experimental, with most 
applying matching techniques to analyze employment-related outcomes. 
14 In the case of transition countries, all programs had positive employment impacts although in three of the 
five programs where earnings effects could be determined, they were neutral or negative. Of the four 
developing country evaluations, only one showed any gains in terms of employment or earnings.   22 
North Africa, South and East Asia and the Pacific, and Sub-Saharan Africa have 
performed almost no impact evaluations of their youth training programs. The region of 
Europe and Central Asia has some share of impact evaluations; however, most of those 
impact evaluations occurred in the 1990s through programs financed/evaluated by the 
World Bank. Overall, the authors find that only 20% and 7% of the training programs for 
young people had had, respectively, net impact evaluations and net impact with cost 
analysis evaluations. Among those training programs with net impact evaluations, about 
60 percent were found to have positive effects on the employment and/or earnings of the 
participants; and when cost effectiveness enters into the calculations, only one-third of all 
programs seem successful. 
 
Reviews of impact evaluations by the World Bank, OECD, and others have concluded 
that policy makers must be cautious regarding what training programs can realistically 
achieve (Martin and Grubb, 2001; Auer et al, 2005; Kluve, 2006) . The evidence suggests 
that these programs are not the panacea for unemployment, but some types of 
interventions, properly designed, can be effective for some workers.  
 
Future Work  
 
While knowledge of the impacts of ALMPs continues to grow in the context of 
developing and transition countries, there is still much more to learn. Some areas for 
future research are the following: 
 
General Equilibrium Effects 
Many studies do not estimate the deadweight, substitution, and displacement effects and 
thus cannot account for the general equilibrium impacts of programs. Even in the case of 
Europe, Kluve et al (2006) point out that the vast majority of evaluation studies continues 
to focus on effectiveness at the microeconomic level. A more complete assessment of 
ALMP effectiveness requires an investigation of general-equilibrium effects.  
 
ALMPs as Insurance Mechanisms? 
Attanasio et al (2007) represent one of the few papers in which, among other issues, the 
role of ALMPs as insurance mechanisms is studied. The authors analyze the Colombian 
workfare program “Empleo en Accion” to shed light on various issues: a) whether or not 
the program crowds out labor effort by members of the household different from the 
participant, b) whether or not there are gains from participating in the program six 
months after the program has finished, and c) whether or not there are gains in household 
consumption, so as to assess the role of the program as an insurance mechanism. The 
authors find that the program positively influenced number of hours worked and both 
individual and household labor income. Household income increased more than 
individual’s income, indicating that the program had some positive externality in the 
other members of the household. 
 
V. Causes and Consequences of Formality and Informality in the Labor Market 
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This section of the review is not concerned with labor policies per se, but with the part of 
the literature that tries to characterize the working of the labor market. Different papers 
have attempted to model the relationship between the formal and informal sectors, with 
the ultimate objective of explaining the drivers of labor market outcomes and to identify 
the appropriate policy responses.  
 
The concept of informal sector has recently been receiving widespread and growing 
attention; as Blunch et al (2001) put it, it might be fair to talk about a re-emergence of the 
concept in the debate related to social protection and poverty reduction.  
 
The informal sector merits treatment first not only because it ostensibly consists of the 
largest mass of unprotected, but also because recent evolution in thinking has 
implications for the design of social protection systems (Canagarajah and Sethuraman, 
2001). The ultimate effect of labor market institutions depend on the functioning of the 
labor market. Since the empirical evidence on the efficiency (and equity) of labor market 
institutions has provided mixed results, it is important to develop an economic model to 
help us think about policy options.  
 
What is the informal sector? And what is its actual size? 
 
Given the prominence of the formal-informal dichotomy in the development discourse, 
one would expect to find a clear definition of the concepts, that is consistently applied 
across the theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis. However, this is definitely not the 
case.  
 
Sindzingre (2007) suggests that definitional problems also stem from the plurality of 
methodologies aimed at quantifying informal activities. There is no unique statistical 
aggregate that corresponds to the concept of informal economy; statistical certainty is 
limited to the sub-sectors, such as the types of enterprises or employment that fulfill 
certain criteria of size, organization, payment of taxes, etc. The quantification of the 
concept is deduced through various tools that produce large approximations: national 
accounts, macro-models, and household and enterprise surveys. There is a discrepancy 
between the informal sector as an artifact of national accounts with specific criteria, 
which is coherent with other macroeconomic aggregates and allows for international 
comparisons, and the plurality of meanings at the microeconomic level. 
 
The concept of the informal labor market relates to the notion of non-participation in tax 
systems, in social security systems, and meeting regulatory requirements. This non 
participation can be the result of legitimate exclusion (e.g. by size of the firm) or from 
non-compliance. According to Betcherman (2002), this informal sector is typically seen 
to include three types of people: a) microentrepreneurs, b) self-employed, and c) 
employees operating in informal sector firms or in informal employment arrangements 
within registered firms. 
 
There is an array of dimensions of informality (Blunch et al, 2001; Jutting et al, 2007; 
Chen, 2007). In the literature, one can find definitions linked to: contribution to   24 
employment, contribution to output, types of activities and enterprises, type of 
employment, skills and human capital, earnings, access to capital and credit, duality 
within the informal sector, legality, poverty, female workers, etc. 
 
Measuring informal employment is difficult, due to different definitions and data 
limitations. As a consequence, it is often not possible to get a good idea on the size and 
the growth of the informal sector. Many establishment surveys often overlook small 
informal sector operators leading to a downward bias in the measurement of the sector. 
Furthermore, more reliable indicators are often available only on the urban informal 
sector; the rural informal sector is more difficult to capture.  
 
Henley et al (2006) is a good example of how different definitions of informality could 
lead to very different measurements. The authors use data from Brazil for the period 1992 
to 2001, to compare three definitions of informality based on employment contract 
registration, social security protection, and the characteristics of the employer and 
employment. They find that around 64 percent of the economically active population was 
informal according to at least one definition, while only 40 precent was informal 
according to all three. There seems to be closer correspondence between informality 
defined by not having a registered employment contract and not contributing to a social 
security scheme. However, a substantial number of workers is classified as informal 
according to the nature of the employment/employer, even when they might contribute to 
social security and have registered contracts. 
 
Likewise, Sindzingre (2007) exemplifies how the plurality of measurement methods 
leads to large variations in estimates as well as figures that are both high and highly 
aggregated. The informal economy, as unreported income form the production of legal 
goods and services, in 2000 would have represented 41 percent of the gross national 
income in developing countries. However, informal employment would have represented 
between one-half to three-quarters of non-agricultural employment in development 
countries. The figures would be higher if informal employment in agriculture is included. 
 
Regional Evidence on Employment 
According to Charmes (2000), available evidence suggests that the informal sector is 
larger in sub-Saharan Africa than in other parts of the developing world, generally 
accounting for 60-80 percent of total non-agricultural employment. In Asia, the informal 
sectors in the South and Southeast are also considered equally large. In comparison, the 
informal sectors in Latin America and North Africa appear to be somewhat smaller, 
generally between 30 and 60 percent of non-agricultural employment.
15
 
 The informal 
sector in Eastern Europe and Central Asia accounts for only about 5-20 percent of non-
agricultural employment; however, there seems to be an upward trend given weak 
employment creation in its nascent private sector (World Bank Reports on Albania and 
Serbia) 
                                                 
15 Charmes regards the informal sector as a group of production units which form a part, within the System 
of National Accounts (SNA), of the household sector as unincorporated enterprises owned by households. 
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Evidence on Output 
For obvious reasons, empirical evidence on the contribution of the informal sector to 
GDP is scarce; however, where estimated, the figures suggest that the informal sector 
contributes significantly to GDP. Charmes (2000) determines that in sub-Saharan Africa 
(excluding South Africa), the informal sector contributes between 20-50 percent of non-
agricultural GDP. His estimates for few countries in South and Southeast Asia, and Latin 
America fall mostly within the same range. 
 
In the end, as Guha-Khasnobis et al (2007) suggest, the formal and informal sectors are 
better thought as metaphors of mental pictures of whatever the user has in mind at a 
particular time. Among the mass of alternative uses of the terms and characterizations, 
they highlight two strands: one is the notion of informal as being outside the reach of 
different levels and mechanisms of official governance (unregistered firms, illegal 
enterprises, etc) and the second has to do with the nature of the organization or the degree 
of structuring (informal is identified with “lacking structure”, “unorganized”, 
“unpredictable”). These two dimensions do interact and therefore, both are needed to 
adequately characterize activities and analyze interventions. The policy issue would then 
be about the “right” reach of the government, taking into account the objectives, the 
implementation of the intervention, as well as the response of the structuring of activities 
to it. 
 
Guha-Khasnobis et al conclude that informality should not be associated directly with 
“chaotic” or “unstructured”, as this association has led to policy disasters. However, the 
authors suggest that the informality-formality terminology can fruitfully characterize a 
continuum of the reach of official intervention in different economic activities. 
 
This section seems to show that the dichotomy informal-formal might give rise to as 
many problems as the solutions it is aiming to provide. The dichotomy gathers empirical 
facts that are heterogeneous. In the next section, the focus is on the different theoretical 
approaches used to model informality. 
  
How to model it? 
 
The traditional development perspective has been a dual labor market view of the 
informal sector as the disadvantaged low-paying and unprotected sector where workers 
go if they are unable to find work in the superior, formal sector. This undoubtedly applies 
to some extent, as informal employment and poverty seem to be strongly correlated. 
Examples are India, Bolivia, Brazil, Panama (Blunch et al, 2001) and LAC (Gasparini 
and Tornarolli, 2007; Perry et al. 2007).  
 
However, the traditional view overstates the dualism. There are many gray areas between 
a purely informal and purely formal employment arrangement and linkages between the 
two sectors. Fields (1990) argues that the informal sector labor markets can be modeled 
in several alternative ways. One is as a free-entry sector, to which workers go when there 
is no other way to make a living. A second model of the informal sector is that it is a 
desirable sector, to which workers aspire. A third model combines the first two and   26 
allows for duality within the informal sector, which then consists both of an easy-entry 





Especially strong is the evidence of voluntary self-employment in LAC. Maloney (2003, 
2004), Gasparini and Tornarolli (2007), Arias and Khamis (2007), Packard (2007), 
among others, support the emerging view that an important part of informality may be 
“voluntary”, and therefore, traditional focus on segmentation in the Harris-Todaro 
tradition might be overstated. The idea is that many workers, firms and families choose 
their optimal level of engagement with the institutions of the state, depending on their 
valuation of the state’s enforcement effort and capability and of the net benefits 
associated with formality (Perry et al, 2007). 
 
Maloney (2004) revisits the concept of informality for the case of Latin America. The 
author uses panel data from Mexico, Argentina and Brazil to follow workers as they 
move across sectors. The bulk of the analysis focuses on males who are self-employed or 
owners of unregistered microenterprises with less than five employees, the « informal 
self-employed ». Maloney argues that this informal sector resembles the voluntary 
entrepreneurial small firm sector found in advanced countries, and not a residual 
comprised of workers rationed out of formal jobs. He also emphasizes that being 
voluntarily informal does not imply not living in poverty, but it often reflects the optimal 
decision given their preferences, their constraints, and the level of formal sector 
productivity in the country. 
 
According to Gasparini and Tornarolli (2007), the cross-section evidence in LAC seems 
to be consistent with the idea of voluntary selfemployment. Unskilled young people enter 
the labor market as wage earners, accumulate knowledge, capital and contacts, and then 
set up their own informal businesses. However, on average, being informal implies lower 
wages, even when controlling for observable factors. Informal male workers without a 
secondary education on average earn 30% less than their formal counterparts. 
 
Arias and Khamis (2007) use recently developed econometric models of essential 
heterogeneity to analyze the relevance of labor market comparative advantage and 
segmentation in the participation and earnings performance of workers in formal and 
informal jobs in Argentina. The authors find no significant differences between the 
earnings of formal salaried workers (those salaried workers with social security 
contribution) and the self-employed (independent workers with no employees and micro-
entrepreneurs of small firms with 1 to 5 employees), once they account for positive 
selection bias into formal salaried work based on tastes. According to the authors, this is 
consistent with compensating differentials and comparative advantage based on tastes as 
the main driver of choice between salaried work and self-employment. On the other hand, 
they find a considerable negative selection bias into formal relative to informal salaried 
work and only modest positive sorting based on expected earnings gains. Thus, the paper 
supports both the “exclusion” and “voluntary” nature of informal employment. 
                                                 
16 Another way of modeling the duality of the informal sector is to specify two informal sectors that are 
geographically distinct (Fields, 2005).   27 
 
Packard (2007) uses data for Chile (1998-1999) to estimate a model with three 
employment types (formal, informal and self-employment). The author finds that there 
are significant barriers to self employment (i.e. an endowment of physical capital) and 
that entrepreneurs can be pushed out of self employment during economic downturns just 
as others are pushed out of formal employment. However, informal employment (without 
a contract) seems to exhibit features of a free-entry, employment safety net depicted in 
the dualistic literature. 
 
Perry et al (2007) find that in selected Latin American countries, the bulk of the self-
employed in the informal sector have moved to that sector voluntarily, whereas most 





Gunther and Launov (2006) test this hypothesis for the case of urban Côte d'Ivoire. The 
authors use an econometric model which allows for a heterogeneous informal sector with 
unobserved individual affiliation and which takes into account selection bias induced by 
the employment decision of individuals. They estimate two specifications of the model: 
one with an homogeneous informal sector and another one with and informal sector 
consisting of two latent groups. Their test results for the urban labor market in Côte 
d'Ivoire indeed show existence of both competitive and segmented employment in the 
informal sector. 
 
Bennett and Estrin (2007) use a simple two-firm, two-period theoretical model to analyze 
the process of entrepreneurial entry for a developing economy. The authors focus on the 
entry by new firms into an industry that did not previously exist in that country and their 
choice between formal and informal status. They analyze how informality may enable an 
entrepreneur to test the profitability of an industry without incurring large sunk costs, and 
how strategic interaction may affect such entrepreneurial decisions. They find that, under 
certain circumstances, the industry would not become established in absence of an 
informal sector. 
 
Nopo and Valenzuela (2007) use difference-in-differences estimates and non-parametric 
matching to analyze the impact on income, hours devoted to work, and home 
responsibilities, of the switch from waged employment to entrepreneurship (self-
employment and headship of micro-enterprises) for the case of Chile from 1996 to 2001. 
The authors find that the income gains associated with this switch are positive, 
statistically significant, and financially substantial. In addition, these gains are larger for 
women than for men. 
 
The modern view is, then, that informal sector comprises both workers preferring formal 
sector employment (involuntary informal) and those preferring the qualities of 
unregulated entrepreneurship. The relative size of these groups varies across countries 
depending on overall productivity levels and labor institutions. If the micro-enterprise 
                                                 
17 Perry et al (2007) argue that even among those informal wage employees, there are workers who have 
voluntarily chosen this option.   28 
sector is used as a proxy for the “upper-tier”, it is generally larger in Latin America and 
Southeast Asia than in sub-Saharan African and South Asia (Blunch et al, 2001; 




Gasparini (2002) illustrates the use of microeconometric decomposition techniques to 
characterize changes in aggregate variables. In particular, the author studies the effect of 
changes in the employment structure on the labor informality rate for salaried workers in 
the greater Buenos Aires area (Argentina). To that aim it computes the difference 
between the informality rate at moment t ' and the rate that results from combining the 
population at moment t with the parameters estimated at moment t ' that link observable 
individual characteristics to the informality decision, based on a model of equalizing 
differences for job amenities. The article concludes that the deep change of the 
employment structure in Argentina during the 1980s and the 1990s has had a significant 
but minor effect on the labor informality rate.  
 
Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2007) develop a theoretical model of an economy in which 
the sizes and wages of the formal and informal sectors are endogenously determined. 
This model consists of a continuum of types on both sides of the labor market (i.e., firms 
and workers). Firms choose whether to operate formally or informally and workers 
choose in what sector they work. In the equilibrium, managerial ability determines size 
dualism at the firm level, and human capital is the factor that determines whether workers 
are employed in the formal or informal sector. Their model accounts for the following 
stylized facts in Latin America: 1) formal wages can be higher than, equal to, or lower 
than informal wages, 2) small firms tend to operate informally while large firms tend to 
operate formally; 3) unskilled workers tend to be informal while skilled ones have formal 
jobs; 4) Ceteris paribus, secondary workers are less likely to operate formally than 
primary workers (The authors use data for Latin America to empirically investigate the 
hypothesis that secondary workers, ceteris paribus, are more likely to work informally if 
the head of household works in the formal sector and found evidence supporting this 
hypothesis). 
 
There are two labor markets, one formal and the other informal, and both firms and 
workers act unconstrained in them. By contrast, a prominent feature of the pre-existing 
literature is the idea that worker’s decisions play no role in determining the equilibrium 
of the economy. The authors show that an increase in the participation of secondary 
                                                 
18 The case of South Africa is puzzling as unemployment is widespread and unemployed do not seem to be 
entering the informal sector. Kingdon and Knight (2001) find that the unemployed do not choose to be 
unemployed, but various impediments to entry into the informal sector increase open unemployment. Some 
hypotheses mentioned by the authors are: lingering licensing controls, zoning regulations, and effective 
detection and prosecution of offenders used to repress informal activities; inhibition of development of 
entrepreneurial and social skills and of social networks caused by disempowerment of Africans under 
apartheid. Cichello et al (2006) also analyze perceived barriers to self-employment in Khayelitsha, a 
township in Cape Town. The following are the main perceived hindrances: crime, risk of business failure 
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workers would tend to raise the level of informality in the economy. This effect partially 
accounts for the increases in informality seen in Latin America over the past two decades. 
 
Gutierrez-Romero (2007) presents a theoretical model linking inequality and the size of 
the informal sector. Then she goes on to calibrate it for 99 countries and show that the 
size of the informal economy is affected by inequality, the registration fees, and the 
financial and legal environment. Therefore, business-friendly policies that reduce the cost 
and time required to set up a business are only one way of encouraging formal sector 
participation. 
 
Loayza and Rigolini (2006) study the trends and cycles of informal employment. The 
authors present a theoretical model in which the size of informal employment is 
determined by the cost to become and remain informal and the distribution of workers’ 
skills. Specifically, the productivity differential has a worker-driven component, given by 
workers’individual skills, and a sector-related component, given by the relative formal-
informal regulatory burden, the strength of enforcement, and the access to productive 
public services. The size of informal employment is then given by the proportion of 
workers whose skills fall below a threshold level where the worker is indifferent between 
the two sectors. The model derives its main results conducting comparative 
statics exercises on the cumulative function of the skill distribution (i.e, the relative size 
of informal employment) and the elasticity of this cumulative function with respect to 
productivity shocks (i.e., the short-run response of informal employment). The paper then 
uses an error-correction framework to test the model. For this purpose, it uses country-
level data at annual frequency for a sample of developed and developing countries, with 
the share of self-employment in the labor force as the proxy for informal employment. 
The paper finds that, in the long run, informality is larger in countries that have lower 
GDP per capita and impose more costs to formal firms, in the form of more rigid business 
regulations, less valuable police and judicial services, and weaker monitoring of 
informality. In the short run, informal employment is found to be counter-cyclical for the 
majority of countries, with the degree of counter-cyclicality being lower in countries with 
larger informal employment and better police and judicial services. Moreover, informal 
employment follows a stable, trend-reverting process. 
 
All the models of the informal sector, and of dual-sector economies, presented in this 
review have concentrated on disparities in the input markets faced by firms in the two 
sectors. However, there is also a literature focused on the dualism of outputs (Banerji and 
Jain, 2007), i.e., informal firms often produce less sophisticated substitutes for the formal 
sector’s product. The authors present a theory of quality dualism, defined in terms of the 
gap between the highest quality good produced in the informal sector and the lowest 
quality good produced in the formal sector. In their model, firms producing in the formal 
and informal sectors face different factor prices, and have a relative advantage in the 
manufacture of different qualities. The authors examine the cyclical behavior of the 
respective sizes of the two sectors and conclude that the countercyclical behavior of the 
informal sector can be understood as a consequence of the countercyclical demand for the 
informal sector’s relatively cheap, and relatively low quality, output. Finally, the authors 
emphasize that the prescriptions for reducing the informal sector may differ greatly from   30 
(and sometimes be directly contrary to) the prescriptions for reducing the degree of 
dualism in the economy. 
 
What factors are behind its apparent growth? 
 
Policy-makers and economists had initially assumed that the informal sector in 
developing countries would diminish over time as countries became industrialized. 
However, this has not happened (Blunch et al, 2001). In the case of LAC, Saavedra 
(2003) shows that the percentage of workers with access to health and pension benefits 
has diminished in most countries, the share of temporary contracts within the formal 
sector has increased, and turnover has generally increased. Informality has been 
increasing with development (Perry et al., 2007) 
 
Betcherman (2002) presents some alternative hypotheses that have been put forward to 
explain these trends: 
a)  The “no-growth” hypothesis: the modern industrial/formal sector has not grown 
fast enough to absorb the growing labor force and hence the informal sector has 
continued to expand. 
b)  The “jobless growth” hypothesis: the technology used in the formal sector has 
not been conducive to the absorption of labor in the formal sector. 
c)  The “growth from below” hypothesis: small and micro-enterprises themselves 
represent a vibrant sector and some entrepreneurs may choose to operate in this 
sector. 
d)  The “regulatory disincentive” hypothesis: employers and, sometimes workers, 
choose the informal sector because it is too costly to operate in the formal 
sector. 
 
Another hypothesis is on the effects of trade on the labor market. According to Gasparini 
(2000), the tendency towards somewhat higher informality does not seem particularly due 
to trade. Though the sector has absorbed some of the workers displaced by foreign 
competition in LAC, the author argues that the rise of informal salaried work predates 
liberalization by half a decade.  
 
World Bank (2006) confirms that there has been a shift from stable formal jobs to casual 
and less formal jobs, including self-employment in ECA. According to this study, this 
trend reflects in part strict employment protection legislation in some countries and also 
flexibility on the part of firms and workers in coping with the situation. This explanation 
seems to be consistent with the “regulatory disincentive” hypothesis.  
 
What is the optimal degree of intervention in the labor market? Should we aim at a 
unique theoretical framework for middle income countries or do the different 
country experiences require different setups? 
According to Fields (2005), whether a policy of formal sector employment creation 
would be expected to have favorable labor market effects depends on which labor market 
model best fits a particular country’s institutional circumstances. Models used in East 
Africa are not expected to fit East Asia, South Africa or Latin America. The “right”   31 
model is definitely context-specific. Even though blending empirical analyses and 





Migration is quite likely the most important macro and microeconomic instrument to deal 
with natural and man-made shocks. Migration is used across the full scale of social risk 
management strategies and includes preventive, mitigating and coping actions. Yet the 
impact of migration on labor markets, employment, and poverty reduction is little 
researched and understood. 
 
Role of the Government 
Reducing the government-induced distortions between formal and informal employment 




1.  There is concern about lack of cross country comparability of labor market 
indicators.  
2.  New modules in household surveys: There is a need for a generalized effort 
toward a better and more homogeneous coverage of social protection issues in 
household surveys. HDNSP’s Informality Project under TFESSD has produced a 
sample module on informality which has been adapted and implemented to 
Bulgaria and Tajikistan household surveys. The LAC region has been working 
with focus groups to analyze the informational needs to improve the design of 
these modules. 
3.  How often and why do workers/firms cross the boundaries between formality and 
informality?  Availability of matched employer-employee data in developing 




In this paper, I reviewed recent advances of research on labor market institutions, 
behavior, and policies in developing countries and made suggestions for future research. 
The four areas of research I focused on were: i) theoretical and empirical implications of 
employment protection legislation on labor outcomes; ii) the issue of shifting from job to 
worker protection, namely, the different alternatives to severance pay: unemployment 
insurance and unemployment insurance savings accounts and their application to 
developing countries; iii) the effect of active labor market programs, particularly of 
training, on labor market outcomes, and iv) the causes and consequences of informality in 
the labor market, with special emphasis on the efforts to model the informal sector. The 
focus of the four sections was on theoretical and empirical work on published in the last 5 
to 7 years, and each section concluded with new directions for future research. 
   32 
Given that theoretical arguments about how EPL affects labor market outcomes are 
generally ambiguous, much effort has been put in determining these effects empirically. 
Despite measurement problems, much has been learned and some stylized facts are found 
in the empirical literature of developing countries. EPL has been shown to reduce 
turnover and to change the composition of employment; furthermore, there is a positive 
association between EPL and self-employment. Most recent studies using large micro-
data sets and new econometric methods have found a negative relationship between EPL 
and employment. Besides from improving the actual measurement of EPL and the 
methods by which its effects on labor market outcomes are captured, it is advisable to 
focus future work on improving data available, analyzing the political economy of labor 
market reforms, taking advantage of other areas of research, and analyzing the economic 
significance of EPL. 
 
The discussion on EPL suggested the need to move away from this type of job protection 
mechanisms, particularly, in countries in which most of the protection takes the form of 
lengthy and difficult administrative procedures. Therefore, I reviewed recent research on 
how to shift from job to worker protection. Even though there have been speeches and 
public debates, there is no clear framework for analyzing this topic. I focused on research 
dealing with unemployment insurance and individual savings accounts in developing 
countries. Ultimately, the performance of both UI and UISA depends on the design of the 
program and on country-specific conditions. This calls for more extensive research in the 
area: by further testing existing systems, and by analyzing the “optimal architecture” of 
labor market institutions (EPL and UI analyzed jointly and not in isolation). 
 
The income support policies described above tend to work better when complemented 
with effective active labor market policies. In this review, I found that the effects of 
training programs on labor market outcomes have been mainly analyzed in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. The evidence suggests that these programs are not the panacea for 
unemployment, but some types of interventions, properly designed, can be effective for 
some workers. Unfortunately, most evaluations do not address the question of the cost-
effectiveness of the programs. Some areas for future research were identified: further 
investigation of general-equilibrium effects, as well as the study of the role of ALMPs as 
insurance mechanisms. 
 
The final substantial section was concerned not with labor policies per se, but with the 
part of the literature that tries to characterize the working of the labor market. Different 
papers have attempted to model the relationship between the formal and informal sectors. 
The traditional development perspective of a dual labor market view of the informal 
sector has been challenged by many. Especially strong is the evidence of voluntary self-
employment in Latin America. As for future work, the impact of migration on labor 
markets, employment, and poverty reduction should be better understood, as well as the 
role of the government-induced distortions between formal and informal employment. 
Finally, there is a need for more and better empirical data in the form of new modules for 
household surveys, matched employer-employee data, and cross-country comparable 
labor market indicators. 
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